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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
T h i s i s a n a p p e a l f rom a j u d g m e n t a n d o r d e r e n t e r e d 
b y t h e H o n o r a b l e S t e w a r t M. H a n s o n , J u d g e o f t h e T h i r d J u d i c i a l 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t , d i s m i s s i n g a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t o f 
h a b e a s c o r p u s u p o n t h e m e r i t s on March 2 6 , 1 9 7 5 . 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
A f t e r h e a r i n g on March 2 5 , 1 9 7 5 , t h e H o n o r a b l e J u d g e 
H a n s o n i s s u e d an o r d e r d i s m i s s i n g a p p e l l a n t ' s p e t i t i o n f o r a 
w r i t o f h a b e a s c o r p u s . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of Judge Hanson's 
order dismissing appe l l an t ' s p e t i t i o n for a wri t of habeas 
corpus. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 27, 1973, Heinlin went to the home of 
Alene and Richard Bjarnson in Springville, Utah. He asked 
Mrs. Bjarnson if he could talk to her husband. When she 
replied that he was not at home/ Heinlin said that he would 
wait outside (T.7). A few minutes later, Heinlin noticed that 
the keys to the Bjarnson1s car were in the ignition and he 
decided that this was his opportunity to get to southern Utah, 
so he took the car (T.45). The Bjarnsons were leasing the 
car from Master Lease of Provo (T.8), and Heinlin admitted that 
he did not have permission from the Bjarnsons or Master Lease 
to take the car (T.47) . Heinlin was arrested by the police 
north of Ephraim when he was stopped at a police roadblock 
still driving the stolen car (T.32) . Heinlin admitted to the 
police that he had stolen the car and he was going to California 
(T.30,31). Heinlin was charged by information that he "did 
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e x e r c i s e u n a u t h o r i z e d ovr. 1 i a 1 o v e r a;i o p e r a b l e 1972 
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a n o t h e r a r r a i gnmen t was h e l d a n d b a s e d on t h e r ecommenda t:i on 
of t h e U t a h S t a t e H o s p i t a l t h e c o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h e m a t t e r 
s h o u l d p r o c e e d , H e i n l i n was r e a d t h e i n f o r m a t i o n , , a c o p y was 
h - - r ' t ^ • . : '• • • > , -. . wa s 
found aa i J r y ci: t h e c r i m e of r h - j I: •-n O c t o b e r / : , j i i 
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J u d o r , p r o s i d i n y , and .;ii November i-., i ^ 7 3 , was s e n t e n c e d t o an 
J-HULL. a i L i a ' I; t ^ rm o-j U'-L . t : . \ - b a n o n e y e a r n o r m o r e t h a n 
f i f t e e n. ye a r s i i i t he Ut a h S t a t e P r i s o n . 
H e i n i : i : f i l e d j . u i - .; w r M . eL i iab t ic i s c o r p u s c h a t 
a l l e g e d amor.M 01 uu; - : . : ' r ; - *;. i -ie ••\*i - •• \ e e e i v e a d e q u a t e 
a s s i s t a n c e u f c o a i i b C x . 'JLUJLS W U S d e i i i e u . l i e n * 1 i n uj_a r e c e i v e 
c o m p e t e n t c o u n s e l t h r o u g h o u t - t h e c r i r . i n n l n r o c c r d i r . q i n s h o w n 
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 t >» -; 
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c I . - . < i . i ' M < i-1 D i M o . j o . ^ i < [\,, • , . _e i s t h e 
t h r e a t o f a s t a m p e d e o f p r i s o n e r s a l a r m i n g t h a i L h e i r a t t o r n e y s 
w e r e n o t e f f e c t i v e m e r e l y b e c a u s e t h e y w e r e n o t a c q u i t t e d . 
C a l i f o r n i a ' s s t a n d a r d o f l e g a l c o m p e t e n c y r e q u i r e s 
t h e p e t i t j o n e r t o s h o w I h .U t h e ' r i - l Vw-s r e d u c e d U a f c j r c e 
o r s i lan t f: 1: i r o u g h 1:1 l e a i t • ,1- ^ " * L : 
- 4 - ' • 
oi- k n o w l e d g e oi: t h e .1 n\\ , o c c I n r e B e a t y , 64 C a l „ 2d 7 6 0 , 
4 i i L , . . . : , • : , . • , ' . • 
Hi ; \ r i ^ o n a , t h e C o u r t a l l o w s a c o n t e n t i o n o f d e p r i -
v a t i o n °"p r i oh t +-o P O U I I S , i ' h e a s s e r t c u n a o e a s norpuf i 
p r o c e e d i n g s on .1 y m e x t r e m e e a s e s . I f a p e t i t i o n e r s e t s 
f o r t h i 10 f a c t s wl l i c h iedj . en t o t h a t i lie a t t o r n e y ' s p e r f o r m a n c e 
was s o si i b s t a i i d a r d • -• r e re* e- ; ] • • i.-> • ••• • \ 
p e t i t i o n i s p r o p e r l y nee i. : . J - See B a r o n v . S t a t e , 7 A r i z . A p p . 
2 . ^
 ( . • , . ' . • • 
The U c J h s t a n d a r d a s n l i e - c ]y d i f f e r e m , I n W a s h i n g t o n 
v . T u r n e r , , l n iu - -h ?d 3G'1' - .*• - . 2 M -t i i i >* i , i a, C o u r t look- .. 
t - : ^ i.. d ilor s u g g e s t i o n s o f "'bad f a i t h c o n d u c t ' on t h e p a r t 
of f n e a t t o r n e y . T h i s c o n c e p t •. T "e ,u l fe : i h" w a s d e f i n e d in 
A1 i r e s v , Ti i n i.ei :, 22 I Jt at i 2< I ] 3 8 , '1 i9 P 2d 24] (.3 969) , a s fo3 1 ows : 
1,11
 1 e /_ due p r o c e s s ^ / r e q u i r e m e n t 
/ o f n o u n s o ! _ / i s no t s a t i s P i e d b y a 
sham o r p r e t e n s e of an a p p e a r a n c e i n 
9 t h e r e c o r d by an a t t o r n e y who m a n i f e s t s 
i i< " e o n c e r i i a b o a ! , ho \\ t c r e s t s o f 
t h e a c c u s e d ^ i iaphus is u d d e d . ) l a , 
• «pile a b o v e s t a t e d s t a n d a r d s i l o u l d b e r e l i e d upo i i i n • 
. e x a m i n i n g t h e a c t i o n s o f p e t i t i o n e r ' s c o u n s e l t o dn t o r m ine 
w h e t l lei: i e .. • a < .: ienn. >d t o a s h a e : e r e t e n s e , or b a d f a i t h ' 
d i s p l a y o f a J a c k of c o n c e r n fo r t h e p e t ' i l i o n e r . 
A. PETITIONER FIRST ALLEGES THAT COUNSEL ERRED 
IN THATHE DID NOT MOVE TO SUPPRESS ILLEGALLY OBTAINED 
ADMISSIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER. 
This same claim of incompetency was raised in Bowen 
v. United States, 192 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1951). The defendant 
had been convicted and did not appeal, but later brought a 
motion to set aside the judgment since his counsel did not 
object to the introduction of an illegally obtained pretrial 
statement. The court rejected this contention by saying: 
"Especially is it of the essence 
of orderly trials that the right to 
counsel accorded to defendants by the 
constitution be not regarded, as the 
argument here would seem to regard it, 
as a mere one way street such that, if 
the strategy and tactics of his trial 
counsel, in determining not to raise 
constitutional questions, prove unsuc-
cessful, defendant, without appealing 
from the judgment, may many years later 
set it aside in order that, on another 
trial with another counsel, another 
course raising these questions may be 
taken, and so on aid. infinitum." 
In Kapsalis v. United States, 345 p. 2d 392 (7th Cir. 
1965), the petitioner claimed he was denied effective counsel 
since there was no objection made to the introduction of 
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i l l e g a l l y obtained evidence. The court dismissed th i s 
a l l ega t ion by saying: 
"Pet i t ioner apparently recognizes 
tha t the term ' e f f ec t i ve ' ass is tance of 
counsel does not necessar i ly mean the 
same as ' success fu l , ' nor re fers to a 
standard of s k i l l . See Mitchell v. 
United S ta tes , 104 U.S.App.D.C. 57, 
259 F.2d 787, 789-790. 
"Simply because counse l ' s t r i a l 
s t ra tegy was unsuccessful or backfired, 
does not indicate in any way that p e t i -
t ioner was deprived of ef fec t ive ass is tance 
of counsel ." 
I t seems c lea r t ha t counsel ' s decis ion to object 
or not to object to a pa r t i cu la r piece of evidence i s par t of 
his overa l l s t ra tegy and i s not to be labeled "incompetence" 
simply because the defendant i s convicted. 
In the d i rec t examination of the a r res t ing of f icer , 
in our case, the off icer t e s t i f i e d tha t Heinlin informed the 
police that he had s to len the car (T.30). Heinlin then t e s t i f i e d 
that the police informed him of h i s r igh t to counsel and tha t he 
had requested, counsel (T.30). However, i t was never e s t ab l i shed , 
in the record tha t Heinlin refused to answer pol ice questions 
u n t i l he could consult an attorney or t h a t the police had to 
pressure him into supplying information. In fact , the a r res t ing 
officer sa id that Heinlin became very t a lka t ive while in police 
J - ~ ^ . , /rn o n \ 
Even i f t he a d m i s s i o n s made by H e i n l i n t o t h e p o l i c e 
s h o u l d have b e e n e x c l u d e d , i t a p p e a r s t h a t i t c o n s t i t u t e d 
h a r m l e s s e r r o r s i n c e H e i n l i n a d m i t t e d on d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n 
t h a t he took t h e c a r ( T . 4 5 ) , and on c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n he 
a d m i t t e d t h a t he d i d n o t have p e r m i s s i o n from t h e B j a r n s o n s 
o r Mas te r Lease t o t a k e t h e c a r ( T . 4 7 ) . S i n c e H e i n l i n a d m i t t e d 
under o a t h t h a t he had t a k e n t h e c a r w i t h o u t p e r m i s s i o n and he 
was going t o d r i v e i t t o Z ions N a t i o n a l Pa rk ( T . 4 8 ) # h i s own 
t e s t i m o n y s u p p l i e d e v i d e n c e of a l l t h e e l e m e n t s of t h e c r ime 
and t h a t any t a i n t e d t e s t i m o n y by t h e p o l i c e t h a t c a u s e d any 
p o s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n of h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s was h a r m l e s s 
beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t and d o e s n o t c a l l f o r r e v e r s a l . 
H a r r i n g t o n v . C a l i f o r n i a , 395 U . S . 250 , 89 S . C t . 1726 , 23 
L . E d . 2 d 284 ( 1 9 6 9 ) . 
B . COUNSEL'S NEXT ALLEGED INCOMPETENCY IS THAT HE 
DID NOT PRESENT THE DEFENSE OF MENTAL DEFECT AVAILABLE UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76 -2 -305 ( 1 9 5 3 ) , AS AMENDED. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76 -2 -305 ( 1 9 5 3 ) , a s amended, s t a t e s : 
11
 (1) In any p r o s e c u t i o n fo r an 
o f f e n s e , i t s h a l l be a d e f e n s e t h a t t h e 
d e f e n d a n t , a t t h e t i m e of t h e p r o s c r i b e d 
c o n d u c t , a s a r e s u l t o f m e n t a l d i s e a s e or 
d e f e c t , l a c k e d s u b s t a n t i a l c a p a c i t y e i t h e r 
t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e w r o n g f u l n e s s of h i s c o n -
d u c t or t o conform h i s c o n d u c t t o the 
v/->«/-fn -i v ^ r r i Q - n + - a r\-P 1 ^TA7 
(2) As used in this section, the 
terms 'mental disease1 or 'defect1 do 
not include an abnormality manifested 
only by repeated criminal or otherwise 
antisocial conduct." 
This identical allegation was raised in People v. 
Heirens, 4 -111.2d 131, 122 N.E.2d 231 (1954). In holding that 
this action was not incompetency that violated due process 
the Illinois Supreme Court said: 
"But the mere fact that counsel 
failed to advise their client to defend 
on such grounds does not amount to a 
denial of due process. Insanity is a 
defense to be asserted at the trial as 
any other defense; and the decision not 
to advise such a defense, even if it 
were a mistake, does not of itself show 
that the defendant was inadequately 
represented. Mistakes of counsel will 
not amount to a denial of due process 
unless on the whole the representation 
is of such low caliber as to be equiva-
lent to no representation at all, and to 
reduce the proceedings to a farce or a 
sham." 
The Illinois Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this 
holding in People v. Hinton, 270 N.E.2d 93 (1971). 
It is clear from the record that Heinlin had his 
day in court on this possible defense and there was no reason 
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fo r c o u n s e l t o b r i n g i t up a g a i n . At h i s f i r s t a r r a i g n m e n t 
on September 7, 1973 , H e i n l i n ' s c o u n s e l p r e s e n t e d a c o m p l a i n t 
t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was i n s a n e (M.E. 4 0 7 ) . The c o u r t o r d e r e d 
H e i n l i n commi t t ed t o t h e Utah S t a t e H o s p i t a l for e x a m i n a t i o n 
and i t was d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e c o m p l a i n t was u n f o u n d e d . At 
t h e second a r r a i g n m e n t on Oc tobe r 5 , 1973 , t h e c o u r t c o n s i d e r e d 
t h e recommenda t ion from t h e S t a t e H o s p i t a l and d e t e r m i n e d 
t h a t t h e m a t t e r s h o u l d p r o c e e d (M.E. 7 1 0 ) . At t h e t r i a l i t s e l f 
on Oc tobe r 10 , 1 9 7 3 , t h e r e was "a d i s c u s s i o n r e l a t i v e t o t h e 
m e n t a l h e a l t h of t h e d e f e n d a n t " a n d d e f e n s e c o u n s e l a r g u e d " t h a t 
t h e d e f e n d a n t was n o t c a p a b l e m e n t a l l y t o have an ' i n t e n t 1 when 
t h e a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n h a p p e n e d . " D e f e n s e was a l l o w e d t o f i l e 
a p r o f f e r of p r o o f i n t o t h e r e c o r d ( M . E . 7 2 3 ) . 
De fense c o u n s e l was w e l l aware of t h e m e n t a l d e f e c t 
d e f e n s e and a t t e m p t e d t o have t h e c o u r t a c c e p t i t . A d e c i s i o n 
n o t to f o l l o w i t up i n f u r t h e r d e t a i l may have been p a r t of 
t r i a l s t r a t e g y t h a t i s n o t to be s e c o n d - g u e s s e d by t h e c o u r t s . 
C. PETITIONER NEXT CONTENDS THAT HIS COUNSEL ERRED 
IN NOT REQUESTING AN INSTRUCTION ON A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE. 
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Once a g a i n # t h e p e t i t i o n e r h a s i n c l u d e d an a r e a 
in which s t r a t e g y and t r i a l t a c t i c s a r e i n v o l v e d . I t i s an 
e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e in many j u r i s d i c t i o n s t h a t c o u n s e l i s n o t t o 
be s e c o n d - g u e s s e d on m a t t e r s of judgment o r t r i a l s t r a t e g y or 
even m i s t a k e s and an u n f a v o r a b l e r e s u l t d o e s n o t by i t s e l f 
amount t o a d e n i a l of e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l . 
A p p l i c a t i o n of Lomich, 221 F . S u p p . 500 (D.C. Mont . 1 9 6 3 ) ; 
U n i t e d S t a t e s v . C a r i o l a , 211 F . S u p p . 423 ( D . C . N . J . 1 9 6 2 ) ; 
U n i t e d S t a t e s e x r e l . B l o l t h v . Denno, 313 F . 2 d 364 (2d C i r . 
1963) . 
D. PETITIONER'S LAST ALLEGATION OF INCOMPETENCY I S 
THAT HIS COUNSEL FAILED TO PRESENT A TIMELY APPEAL. 
In Johnson v . T u r n e r , 24 Utah 2d 4 3 9 , 473 P .2d 901 
( 1 9 7 0 ) , t h e p e t i t i o n e r a l l e g e d in a p e t i t i o n f o r w r i t of 
h a b e a s c o r p u s t h a t i t was h i s c o u n s e l ' s i ncompe tency t h a t l e d 
t o a f a i l u r e t o a p p e a l h i s c o n v i c t i o n . The Utah Supreme C o u r t 
r e j e c t e d t h i s a l l e g a t i o n , s a y i n g : 
"The re i s no a f f i r m a t i v e showing 
i n t h e r e c o r d t h a t Mr. F r a i z e r d i d not 
a d v i s e p e t i t i o n e r c o n c e r n i n g h i s r i g h t 
t o a p p e a l . P e t i t i o n e r ' s a rgument r e s t s 
s o l e l y upon h i s o n l y ave rmen t i n t h i s 
p r o c e e d i n g . I f any i n f e r e n c e were t o be 
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drawn on the matter the likelihood 
is to the contrary. Where a person 
is represented by a member of the Bar 
in good standing; and where, insofar 
as the record discloses, he represented 
the accused in a diligent and capable 
manner, it seems fair to assume that he 
similarly fulfilled his duties in other 
respects and advised him concerning his 
rights ." 
It has been decided by the Utah Supreme Court that 
the mere failure of counsel to perfect an appeal in a criminal 
case is not a denial of due process. Burleigh v. Turner, 15 
Utah 2d 118, 388 P.2d 412 (1964). 
Respondent contends that on review of a habeas corpus 
proceeding, the Court should take cognizance of the presumption 
that the prisonerfs rights were safeguarded by the trial court, 
and that the defense counsel faithfully performed his duty to 
protect the defendant's rights. See Busby v. Holman, 356 F.2d 
75 (5th Cir. 1966). It then becomes incumbent upon the peti-
tioner to prove his right to relief by showing the incompentency 
of his counsel. Such a burden is a heavy one and relief is 
granted only in extreme cases where counsel has been so grossly 
ineffective as to constitute no representation at all, or farce, 
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sham, pre tense , e t c . Respondent contends tha t t h i s burden 
of proof has not been met by pe t i t i one r and the decisions 
of t r i a l counsel were made in his best i n t e r e s t . 
Furthermore, Heinlin received some notice from the 
court tha t he had the r i g h t to appeal due to the c o u r t ' s d i s -
cussion with both counsel t h a t the court would en te r ta in a 
motion only a f te r the time for appeal had run if an appeal i s 
not taken (T.55). 
F ina l ly , in l ight of He in l in ' s cr iminal record, he 
knew, or should have known, about t r i a l s and appeals; and he 
did not request tha t court-appointed at torney f i l e an appeal 
on his behalf . There i s no showing t h a t the attorney was 
incompetent because of h is f a i lu re to f i l e an appeal . 
As s ta ted by Chief Jus t i ce Crockett in the majority 
opinion of Johnson v. Turner, supra: 
" I t makes ver i t ab le mockery 
of the ru les of procedure to permit 
a person to ignore the time l i m i t a -
t ions for taking procedural s teps 
and obtain an appe l la te review of a 
judgment at any time he takes a 
notion by a habeas corpus proceeding. 
The e f f i c i en t and orderly adminis tra-
t ion of ju s t i ce and respect for the 
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f i n a l i t y of j udgmen t s r e g u l a r l y 
a r r i v e d a t demand t h a t t h e m e r r y -
g o - r o u n d of l i t i g a t i o n s t o p 
somewhere ." 
CONCLUSION 
The t r i a l c o u r t was c o r r e c t i n i t s d e n i a l of 
p e t i t i o n e r ' s p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of h a b e a s c o r p u s s i n c e p e t i -
t i o n e r r e c e i v e d c o m p e t e n t , e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l in 
t h e p r e p a r a t i o n and p r e s e n t a t i o n o f h i s d e f e n s e . 
' P e t i t i o n e r ' s a l l e g a t i o n s a r e t o t a l l y f r i v o l o u s and 
w i t h o u t m e r i t . Responden t r e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t s t h a t t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n s h o u l d be a f f i r m e d . 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d , 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
EARL F . DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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